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THE  AMERICAN-HELLENic 

'  4;  *  iSwfcj aTEgWgjwflSP*» ; '.  .  '  M  . 


Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  PhJ>,  :U^ 
Fice-Presidenti 

Charles  W.  Eliot,  Ph.D.,  LL. 
Jacob  G.  Schuman,  D.Sc,  IX. 


^  - - - - -  *  a/  W  |f 

(National  University  of  Greece) 


ri\  ,i  ,.  "  -  J,v  ^ ' . '■' 


SS3g§ 


v>>.*^? 


■  -^>  :  W  •>  : 

•'■wV. 


>h* 


Edward  D.  Perry,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.  Rev.  F.  G. 

•James  R.  Wheeler,  Ph.D,  LL.D.  Rev.  W.  “ 

Edward  Robinson,  LL.D.,  D.Litt.  Charles 

Andrew  F.  West,  Ph.D.,  LLJD. 

William  Kelly  Prentice,  Ph.D.  A.  K.  pnoutrtaeSi 

George  M.  Whicher,  DXitt.  5,aPha«'  De2J°®- 1 

Frederic  R.  Coudert,  ,Ph.D.  C.  R.  Post, 

Petros  Tatanis 
Very  Rev.  D.  Callimachos,  D.D.  p  r?'  1'erry 

.  (National  University  of  Greece)  Alèr  Sedvwirfc 
Thomas  Dwight  Ooodell,  Pb.D.  Ale*.  Sedewick 


Wi 


William  F.  Harris 


TVTiran  ^spvaclw 

(  Chairman  of  Mass.  Local  Council)  Anthony  Benachi 
Herbert  W.  Smyth,  Ph.D.  G 

mm.  1 .  . 


George  H.  Chase,  jtii.jl/. 

William  S,  Ferguson,  Ph.D.  D.  C.,  |f||j 

Charles  B.  Gulick,  Ph.D.  Stephen  M.  Ne 

L  D.  Caskey,  Ph.D.  Mitchell  Carroll, 

Mrs.  C.  E.  Whitmore  Johr 


GREECE  BEFORE  THE 
PEACE  CONGRESS  OF  1919 


A  MEMORANDUM  DEALING  WITH  THE 
RIGHTS  OF  GREECE 


SUBMITTED  BY 

ELEUTHERIOS  VENIZELOS 

PRIME-MINISTER  OF  GREECE 


A  REVISED  TRANSLATION  FROM  THE  FRENCH  ORIGINAL 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE 

AMERICAN-HELLENIC  SOCIETY 

105  WEST  40th  STREET,  NEW  YORK 
BY 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS  AMERICAN  BRANCH 

35  WEST  32nd  STREET,  NEW  YORK 

1919 


Copyright  1919 

BY  THE 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

American  Branch 


GREECE  BEFORE  THE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


The  complete  victory  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
States  affords  the  occasion  to  fix  the  political  frontiers 
of  the  European  States  in  exact  accordance,  or  at  any 
rate  in  approximate  accordance,  with  the  limits  of  their 
ethnical  domain.  In  this  way  the  indispensable  basis  of 
the  Society  of  Nations  will  be  created. 

The  Hellenic  nation  is  distributed  as  follows: 

1.  4,300,000  inhabitants  of  the  Kingdom  of  Greece; 

2.  151,000  in  Northern  Epirus  and  Albania; 

3.  731,000  in  Thrace  and  the  region  of  Constantinople; 

4.  43,000  in  Bulgaria  as  it  was  before  the  Balkan 

Wars;  * 

5.  1,694,000  in  Asia  Minor; 

6.  102,000  in  the  Dodecanesus; 

7.  235,000  in  the  Island  of  Cyprus; 

8.  1,000,000  or  thereabout,  distributed  variously:  notably 

in  Egypt  and  in  the  rest  of  the  African  Con¬ 
tinent:  150,000;  in  North  and  South  America: 
450,000;  in  Southern  Russia:  400,000. 

All  told,  the  Hellenic  nation  comprises  8,256,000  souls, 
of  whom  55  per  cent  live  in  the  Kingdom  of  Greece  and 
45  per  cent  outside  its  limits. 

What  are  the  Greek  populations,  living  outside  the 
present  Kingdom  of  Greece,  which  might  be  included 
in  it  if  its  frontiers  were  extended? 

The  inclusion  of  the  1,000,000  Greeks  scattered  all 
over  the  world  is,  of  course,  out  of  the  question. 

Let  us  consider,  then,  the  Greek  populations  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  of  Asia  Minor  and  of  the  Islands. 

*  The  territories  which  were  annexed  to  Bulgaria  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest 
carried  with  them  other  88,000  Greeks. 


THE  BALKAN  PENINSULA 


I.  Northern  Epirus 

Northern  Epirus  comprises  a  mixed  population  of 
230,000. 

The  districts  of  Courvelessi,  the  parts  of  the  kazas  of 
Tepelini  and  Premeti,  which  are  situated  to  the  north 
of  the  Yoyoussa,  and  the  kaza  of  Starovo  (lying  to  the 
north  of  the  Devoli),  their  population  being  practically 
entirely  Albanian,  might,  without  inconvenience,  be  de¬ 
tached  from  Northern  Epirus  and  attached  to  Albania. 
There  would  then  remain  in  Northern  Epirus  a  Greek 
population  of  120,000  and  an  Albanian  population  of 
80,000,  so  inextricably  mixed  that  it  would  not  be  pos¬ 
sible  to  separate  them  geographically  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  include  the  Greeks  in  the  Greek  State  and  the 
Albanians  in  the  Albanian  State.  Greece  maintains  that 
this  mixed  population  ought  necessarily  to  be  allotted  to 
her,  for  it  would  be  contrary  to  all  equity  that  a  majority 
with  a  higher  civilization  should  have  to  submit  to  a 
minority  with  an  inferior  civilization.  Granted  that 
Albania  would  be  unable  to  exist  as  an  independent  state 
except  under  foreign  guardianship,  one  cannot  see  why 
this  mixed  population  should  be  included  in  the  Albanian 
State,  which  is  incapable,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  of 
possessing  a  really  autonomous  government,  and  not  in 
the  Greek  State,  which  already  enjoys  an  independent 
political  existence. 

One  may  be  tempted  to  raise  the  objection  that  a  sub¬ 
stantial  portion  of  this  Greek  population  has  Albanian 
as  its  mother  tongue,  and  is  consequently,  in  all  prob¬ 
ability,  of  Albanian  origin;  but  the  democratic  concep- 

2 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  3 

tions  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  cannot  admit 
of  any  other  criterion  of  nationality  than  that  of  national 
consciousness.  Only  the  Teutonic  conception  could 
prefer  the  criterion  of  race  or  of  language.  Notwith¬ 
standing  that  the  majority  of  them  speak  Albanian,  the 
Greeks  in  Northern  Epirus  have  formed  part  of  the 
Greek  family  for  centuries,  long  before  the  foundation 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Greece.  They  furnished,  in  the 
course  of  the  War  of  Greek  Independence,  many  of  the 
military  leaders  of  the  revolted  nation.  One  of  the  finest 
pages  in  the  history  of  Greece  records  “  the  dance  of 
Zalongo,”  where  the  women  of  Souli,  whose  mother 
tongue  was  Albanian,  threw  themselves  from  the  height 
of  a  steep  mountain,  after  having  cast  their  own  children 
into  the  abyss,  in  order  not  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  Mahommedan  Albanians,  who  were  besieging  their 
country. 

It  may  be  useful  to  add  that  Mr.  Repoulis,  the  present 
Vice-President  of  the  Greek  Ministerial  Council,  General 
Danglis,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Greek  Army, 
Admiral  Coudouriotis,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Greek  Naval  Forces  and  Minister  of  Marine,  as  well 
as  the  majority  of  the  crews  of  the  Greek  Navy,  speak 
Albanian  as  their  mother  tongue. 

As  to  that  which  is  more  particularly  Greek  in  the 
character  of  Corytza,  which  the  Albanians  today  attempt 
to  put  forward  as  the  center  of  their  intellectual  move¬ 
ment,  it  should  be  noted: 

1.  — That  the  Greek  schools,  supported  exclusively  by 
legacies  from  the  people  of  Corytza,  had  before  the 
Balkan  Wars  2,250  scholars,  whereas  the  single  Albanian 
'school,  although  carried  on  under  excellent  American 
management,  had  only  about  two  hundred; 

2.  — That  thirty  years  ago  the  Greek  community  of 
this  town  refused  a  legacy  of  $120,000  (or  600,000 
francs)  left  by  Liaktsis  Avramidis,  because  it  had  been 


4  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


bequeathed  under  the  condition  that  Albanian  should  be 
taught  in  the  Greek  schools.  This  decision,  the  meaning 
of  which  I  need  not  dwell  upon,  shows  what  degree  of 
fanaticism  the  national  sentiment  of  the  community  had 
reached. 

3. — That  in  1886  the  same  community  declined  another 
legacy  of  $20,000  (or  100,000  francs)  left  by  Hercules 
Douris,  solely  because  it  was  devised  to  the  “  Orthodox 
Community  of  Corytza,”  whereas  they  wished  to  be  called 
“  the  Greek  Orthodox  Community  of  Corytza,”  thus 
preferring  to  renounce  the  legacy  rather  than  the  right 
to  be  called  Greek,  even  though  it  was  merely  a  question 
of  wording  in  a  formal  document  of  acceptance. 

It  must  further  be  noted  that  when,  after  the  Balkan 
Wars,  Northern  Epirus  was  included,  in  virtue  of  the 
Protocol  of  Florence,  in  the  Albanian  State,  and  the 
Greek  Government  withdrew  its  troops  and  its  officials, 
the  inhabitants  formed  a  provisional  government  and  an 
army  of  their  own,  and  refused  to  submit  to  the  Albanian 
administration. 

The  Albanian  State  proving  incapable  of  enforcing 
its  power,  the  International  Commission  of  Control  in 
Albania  was  obliged  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
Provisional  Government  of  Northern  Epirus.  Long  dis¬ 
cussions  resulted  in  the  signing,  on  May  17,  1914,  at 
Corfu,  of  a  protocol  which,  while  retaining  Northern 
Epirus  within  the  limits  of  the  State  of  Albania,  recog¬ 
nized  the  right  of  the  former  to  have  a  local  autonomous 
administration  (see  Appendix  I). 

At  the  beginning  of  the  European  War,  the  Prince  of 
Wied  abandoned  the  Albanian  throne,  and  the  anarchy, 
which  had  not  ceased  to  reign  in  the  country,  spread 
more  and  more  widely  in  Albania  and  Northern  Epirus. 
The  British  Minister  at  Athens,  in  the  name  of  the  Gov¬ 
ernments  of  the  Entente  Powers,  then  asked  the  Greek 
Government  if  it  would  be  disposed  to  undertake  a  new 
military  occupation  of  Northern  Epirus,  in  order  to 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  5 

establish  order  sufficiently  to  permit  the  Mahommedan 
inhabitants,  who  had  taken  refuge  at  Valona,  to  return 
to  their  homes  before  the  winter  and  cultivate  their  lands. 
It  was  to  be  understood  that  the  definite  settlement  of 
the  question  of  Northern  Epirus  would  be  reserved  for 
the  Peace  Congress.  The  Greek  Government  replied 
that  it  accepted  this  mandate  on  condition  of  having,  in 
addition  to  the  consent  of  the  Entente  Powers,  that  of 
the  Italian  Government.  Under  the  auspices  of  Great 
Britain,  an  agreement  was  reached  under  which  Italy 
would  occupy  Valona,  and  Greece  Northern  Epirus,  the 
duty  of  pronouncing  definitely  as  to  these  occupations 
being  left  to  the  Peace  Congress.  But  it  was  tacitly 
understood  that  if,  at  the  time  of  the  general  peace,  the 
occupation  of  Valona  by  Italy  was  confirmed,  that  of 
Northern  Epirus  by  Greece  would  become  equally  defi¬ 
nite.  Also,  while  recognizing,  in  the  Treaty  of  London 
of  April  26,  1915,  the  right  of  Italy  to  occupy  Valona, 
the  Entente  Powers  stipulated  that  the  limits  of  this 
occupation  to  the  south  must  not  exceed  the  limits  of 
Northern  Epirus. 

II.  Thrace 

Thrace,  with  Constantinople,  has  a  Greek  population 
of  730,822  (see  Appendix  II). 

It  comprises,  according  to  Turkish  statistics,  a  Bul¬ 
garian  population  of  only  112,174. 

The  Bulgarians  recognized  so  fully  the  Greek  char¬ 
acter  of  Thrace  that  when,  in  1912,  it  became  necessary 
to  co-operate,  in  view  of  the  elections,  against  the  Otto- 
manizing  programme  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress,  it  was  agreed  between  the  Greeks  and  the 
Bulgarians,  under  the  auspices  of  the  (Ecumenical 
Patriarchate  and  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  that  their 
coalition  in  Thrace  would  support  seven  Greek  candi¬ 
dates  against  only  one  Bulgarian  candidate. 

In  the  event  that  Constantinople,  whose  Greek  popu- 


6  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


lation  is,  numerically  speaking,  only  slightly  inferior  to 
the  Turkish  population,  should  not  be  restored  to  Greece, 
but  should  form  the  capital  of  an  international  state 
designed  to  guarantee  the  freedom  of  the  Straits,  the 
national  claims  of  Greece  on  the  rest  of  Thrace  should, 
by  this  very  fact,  be  strengthened. 

It  is  true  that  the  extension  of  the  Greek  frontier  in 
Thrace  would  necessitate  the  exclusion  of  Bulgaria  from 
the  Ægean  Sea,  where  she  has  been  since  the  Balkan 
Wars,  by  virtue  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest.  But  this 
exclusion  can  and  should  take  place  by  virtue  of  the 
right  of  nations  to  decide  their  future — a  principle  which, 
it  has  been  recognized,  must  serve  as  the  basis  of  the 
coming  peace. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  a  line  be  traced,  starting  from 
the  summit  of  Koula  (Kouhlar  Dag,  or  Hill  2,177)  on  the 
present  Greco-Bulgarian  northeastern  frontier,  thence 
following  the  course  of  the  Arda  down  to  its  confluence 
with  the  Maritza,  and  then  along  the  Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier  of  1913  (except  perhaps  for  a  slight  modifica¬ 
tion  in  favor  of  Bulgaria)  to  the  northeast  of  Kirk- 
Kilisse,  as  far  as  Cape  Iniada,  there  would  be  established 
between  Bulgaria  and  Greece  a  natural  frontier  which 
would  enable  the  latter  to  incorporate  Thrace  in  her  own 
territory.  Since  this  new  Greek  territory  would  include 
only  a  very  small  Bulgarian  minority,  of  69,000  Bul¬ 
garian  inhabitants,  its  incorporation  with  Greece  would 
be  in  full  conformity  with  the  principle  of  nationality. 

Moreover,  if  the  fact  be  taken  into  account  that 
Rumania  might  be  disposed,  once  her  national  unity  is 
realized,  to  return  to  Bulgaria  that  part  of  the  Dobrudja 
which  fell  to  her  lot  in  1913,  and  which  constitutes  one 
of  the  richest  regions  of  the  Balkans,  one  sees  that,  even 
after  giving  up  Western  Thrace,  Bulgaria  will  be  the 
only  one  of  all  the  Allied  Central  Powers  to  emerge 
without  loss  from  the  war,  to  the  prolongation  of  which, 
however,  she  contributed  by  her  intervention. 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  7 


It  may  be  objected  .that,  in  this  case,  the  principle  of 
nationality  should  give  way  before  the  economic  interest 
of  Bulgaria  in  having  an  outlet  on  the  Ægean  Sea.  But 
this  interest  is  not  sufficiently  essential  to  demand  the 
sacrifice  of  the  paramount  interest  which  a  people  feels 
in  living  under  an  administration  in  harmony  with  its 
national  consciousness.  The  new  outlines  of  the  map  of 
Europe  will  leave  more  than  one  state  without  access 
to  the  sea;  for  example,  the  Czecho-Slovac  country, 
Hungary,  German  Austria,  and  perhaps  Poland.  Neces¬ 
sarily,  the  treaty  of  peace  will  lay  down  new  rules  of 
international  law  in  order  to  assure  to  such  states,  under 
international  guarantees,  a  commercial  outlet  to  the  sea. 
Moreover,  although  Bulgaria  is  already  established  on 
the  Black  Sea,  which,  thanks  to  guaranteed  freedom  of 
passage  through  the  Straits,  will  become  open  and  free, 
Greece  is  nevertheless  disposed  to  grant  to  Bulgaria  a 
commercial  outlet  on  the  Ægean  Sea  under  the  same 
conditions  that  states  with  no  access  to  the  sea  will  be 
assured  of  a  commercial  outlet. 

One  must,  however,  take  into  account  the  lessons  of 
the  submarine  warfare  when  one  is  trying  to  find  out 
which  of  the  two  interests  is  the  more  important  and 
weighty;  that  of  Bulgaria  in  reaching  the  Ægean  Sea 
or  that  of  Greece  in  preserving  her  territorial  continuity 
and  thus  obtaining  her  extension  in  Thrace. 

Bulgaria  is  an  eminently  continental  state;  for  her 
defense  she  does  not  require  naval  strength.  If  she 
retains  the  coast  of  the  Ægean,  she  may  utilize  Porto- 
Lago  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  there  an  excellent 
submarine  base,  which  would  enable  her  to  upset,  for  her 
own  benefit,  the  equilibrium  of  forces  between  herself 
and  Greece. 

The  latter,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  has  an  island  population 
of  nearly  a  million  and  a  half.  In  case  of  war,  Bulgaria, 
with  her  submarines,  could  delay  the  transport  and  the 
concentration  in  Macedonia  of  the  Greek  forces  from  the 


8  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 

Islands,  and  thereby  place  Greece  in  a  very  dangerous 
inferiority  from  the  point  of  view  of  defense. 

So  far  we  have  examined  the  question  without  any  bias 
against  Bulgaria,  as  if  both  Greece  and  Bulgaria  were 
presenting  themselves  before  the  Peace  Congress  with 
an  equal  right  to  the  benevolent  consideration  of  the 
judges  who  will  decide  on  their  opposing  claims.  We 
have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  impartial  considera¬ 
tion  of  their  respective  interests  leads  to  the  recognition 
of  the  absolute  superiority  of  the  Greek  claims. 

But  we  must  also  inquire  whether  Bulgaria  is  entitled 
to  expect  any  benevolence  whatever  at  the  hands  of  the 
Congress;  for  this  inquiry  will  enable  the  representatives 
of  the  Allies  to  judge  and  regulate  Balkan  affairs  in  a 
manner  more  in  accord  not  only  with  equity  but  also 
with  the  general  interest. 

People  who  do  not  know  the  facts  from  near  acquaint¬ 
ance  generally  believe  that  Bulgaria,  at  the  time  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  (1913),  was  un¬ 
justly  treated  by  her  allies. 

I  desire  to  dispel  this  prejudice  and  I  am  sure  that 
I  shall  succeed  in  this,  by  setting  forth  the  history  of 
the  respective  attitudes  of  Greece  and  Bulgaria  during 
the  Balkan  Wars.  It  is  necessary  first  of  all  to  find 
out  whether  the  claim  of  Bulgaria  to  hegemony  in  the 
Balkans  rests  on  any  sound  basis. 

Bulgaria  sought  to  found  this  claim  on  the  superiority 
of  her  military  organization.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
hardly  had  she  been  created  an  autonomous  state  when 
she  went  seriously  to  work  to  organize  her  army;  and, 
until  1903,  she  was,  next  to  Turkey,  the  only  Balkan 
State  that  had  at  her  disposal  a  strong  army. 

Moreover,  for  a  whole  generation,  foreign  public 
opinion  had  come,  not  without  reason,  to  regard  Bul¬ 
garia  as  the  only  important  factor  in  the  Balkans. 

If,  at  that  moment,  Bulgaria  had  been  able,  by  herself, 
to  settle  the  Eastern  Question,  in  a  single-handed 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  9 


struggle  with  Turkey,  it  is  more  than  probable  she 
would  have  been  able  to  establish  her  hegemony  in  the 
Balkans,  and  the  other  states  of  the  Peninsula  would 
simply  have  had  their  own  lack  of  foresight  to  blame. 

But  since  then  the  situation  has  completely  changed. 
After  the  accession  of  King  Peter,  Serbia  began  to  pay 
special  attention  to  military  organization,  and  a  little 
later,  in  1909,  a  similar  movement  began  in  Greece,  so 
much  so  that,  in  1912,  Serbia  and  Greece  were  able  to 
place  well-organized  armies  in  the  field  against  Turkey. 
Greece,  moreover,  had  a  fleet,  which  by  giving  the 
Balkan  Allies  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  prevented  Turkey 
from  transporting  her  reserves  from  Asia  Minor  to  her 
fronts  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  by  the  shortest  route — 
that  of  the  sea;  it  was  this  combined  strength  of  the 
three  states  that  enabled  a  victorious  war  to  be  conducted 
against  Turkey. 

Later  on,  when  Bulgaria  resorted  to  a  decision  by 
arms,  suddenly  attacking  her  own  allies,  Serbia  and 
Greece  succeeded  in  a  single  month  in  crushing  her 
army.  From  that  time  it  became  manifest  that  Bul¬ 
garia’s  pretensions  to  hegemony  could  no  longer  be 
based  on  military  superiority. 

Neither  could  these  pretensions  be  based  on  superiority 
in  numbers  or  in  civilization.  It  is  obvious  that  Bulgaria 
cannot  plead  any  such  superiority  over  the  other  Chris¬ 
tian  nationalities  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

Can  she,  as  compared  with  the  other  nations  of  the 
Peninsula,  racially  claim  a  numerical  superiority  ? 

According  to  her  own  official  statistics  of  1910,  the 
Bulgarian  State  comprised,  before  the  Balkan  Wars, 
4,337,516  inhabitants,  of  whom  only  3,497,794  were  Bul¬ 
garians  and  the  rest  belonged  to  various  nationalities 
(Turks,  Rumanians,  Greeks,  Gypsies,  etc.). 

It  is  certainly  difficult  to  determine  the  exact  number 
of  Bulgarians  not  included  in  Bulgaria  before  the  Balkan 
Wars.  According  to  Turkish  statistics  (see  the  Hassir , 


10  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


the  official  journal  of  Salonica,  No.  994,  1904),  there 
were  in  Macedonia,  757,532  adherents  of  the  Bulgarian 
Exarchate  (that  is  Slavs  that  declared  themselves  to  be 
Bulgars)  ;  there  were  in  addition  107,843  in  the  vilayet 
of  Adrianople  and  4,331  in  that  of  Constantinople.  If 
to  these  be  added  the  100,000  Bulgarians  in  Bessarabia, 
and  Rumania,  the  whole  Bulgarian  nation  does  not  reach 
4,500,000.  Even  if  we  accept  the  most  exaggerated  cal¬ 
culations  of  the  Bulgarian  propagandists,  we  shall  not 
arrive  at  five  millions. 

The  total  number,  composing  this  nation,  therefore,  is 
far  inferior  to  that  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  and  to  that  of 
the  Rumanians,  each  of  which  comprises  a  population 
twice  as  large  as  the  Bulgarian  nation,  taken  as  a  whole. 
It  is  inferior  even  to  the  Greek  total,  being  barely  60 
per  cent  of  the  latter. 

One  can  conceive,  then,  to  what  degree  the  conscience 
of  the  other  nationalities  of  the  Peninsula  revolts  against 
Bulgaria’s  pretensions  to  the  establishment  of  her  hege¬ 
mony  in  the  Balkans,  extending  her  dominion  not  only 
over  the  whole  of  Macedonia,  Thrace,  Rumanian  Do- 
brudja,  but  even  over  a  great  part  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Serbia,  as  far  as  the  Morava,  and  over  at  least  a  portion 
of  Albania,  which  would  place  her  in  a  position  to 
realize  her  dream  of  the  four  seas — the  Black  Sea,  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  the  Ægean  Sea  and  the  Adriatic — - 
bathing  the  shores  of  a  Bulgarian  Empire,  of  which 
Constantinople  would  be  the  capital. 

In  spite  of  all,  during  the  Balkan  Wars,  Greece 
showed  such  moderation  and  such  a  spirit  of  conciliation 
before  Bulgaria’s  exaggerated  demands,  that  at  the  Con¬ 
ference  of  London,  she  did  not  hesitate  to  support  the 
pretensions  of  Bulgaria  to  the  whole  of  Thrace  as  far 
as  Rodosto,  and  agreed  even  to  abandon  Eastern  Mace¬ 
donia  to  her.  On  her  part,  Serbia  recognized  the  exten¬ 
sion  of  Bulgaria  up  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vardar,  and 
agreed  to  submit  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Czar  the  dis- 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  11 

putes  with  regard  to  the  territories  situated  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Vardar.  It  is  more  than  probable  that  if 
Bulgaria  had  accepted  this  arbitration,  she  would  have 
risked  losing  nothing  more  than  the  contested  zone,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  delimitation  established  by  the  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  Treaty. 

Consequently,  if  Bulgaria  had  not  betrayed  her  allies, 
if  she  had  not,  by  her  aggression,  provoked  the  Second 
Balkan  War,  she  would  have  secured,  in  the  Balkan 
territory  liberated  from  the  Turks,  a  larger  part  than 
that  of  her  three  allies  put  together — Greece,  Serbia  and 
Montenegro. 

The  attitude  of  Greece  in  this  conjuncture  may  appear 
inexplicable.  In  fact,  by  her  concessions  to  Bulgaria,  she 
sacrificed  nearly  a  million  of  Greeks:  in  Eastern  Mace¬ 
donia,  121,439,  and  in  Thrace  and  Constantinople,  730,- 
922.  But  I  then  believed  in  the  possibility  of  creating 
a  Balkan  Confederation  as  a  consequence  of  the  crusade 
of  the  Christian  states  of  the  Balkans  against  Turkey. 
No  price  appeared,  in  my  eyes,  too  exorbitant  in  order 
to  attain  such  an  objective.  I  also  thought  that  in  sacri¬ 
ficing  to  Bulgaria  the  Greeks  in  Eastern  Macedonia  and 
Thrace,  I  was  offering  her  such  ample  satisfaction  on 
that  side,  that  she  would  necessarily  show  herself  more 
conciliatory  as  to  Central  and  Western  Macedonia,  so  as 
to  make  possible  the  peaceable  partition  of  those  terri¬ 
tories  with  Greece  and  Serbia.  It  should  also  be  noted 
that  by  these  concessions,  Bulgaria  would  have  become 
as  large  as  the  Bulgaria  of  the  San  Stefano  Treaty,  with 
only  this  difference  that  she  would  have  exchanged  for 
Thrace  a  portion  of  Western  Macedonia. 

But  another  fact  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in 
order  to  appreciate  the  attitude  toward  each  other  of 
Greece  and  Bulgaria. 

After  the  signature  in  London,  in  May,  1913,  of 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  the  Balkan  League  and 
Turkey,  Bulgaria  began  to  transport  into  Macedonia 


12  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


the  army  she  had  before  Chatalja  and  Bulair,  and  to 
concentrate  it  in  front  of  the  Greek  and  Serbian  armies. 
She  made  no  secret  at  all  of  her  design  to  attack  her  allies, 
as  soon  as  the  concentration  of  this  army  had  been  com¬ 
pleted. 

The  Greek  General  Staff  then  called  my  attention  to 
the  state  of  inferiority  in  which  we  would  be  placed  in 
case  we  permitted  these  movements  to  be  carried  out  to 
the  end.  Our  Staff  recommended  that  Bulgaria  should 
be  requested  to  suspend  her  concentrations  against  our 
troops,  threatening  otherwise  to  attack  her  in  order  to 
prevent  such  concentrations. 

I  recognized  fully  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  I 
refused,  nevertheless,  to  fall  in  with  the  opinion  of  the 
General  Staff,  so  formidable  did  I  regard  the  responsi¬ 
bility  of  anyone  who  provoked,  between  the  members  of 
the  Balkan  League,  an  armed  conflict  which  the  whole 
world  would  characterize  as  a  fratricidal  war  and  which 
would  be  the  death-blow  to  the  idea  of  a  Balkan  Con¬ 
federation.  I  preferred  to  face  all  the  perils  inherent  in 
the  act  of  leaving  to  Bulgaria  the  initiative  of  the  attack, 
rather  than  to  strike  the  first  blow. 

It  was  under  these  conditions  that  Bulgaria  started  the 
campaign  against  her  allies.*  She  came  out  of  it,  as  I 
have  already  said,  completely  beaten.  Now,  even  after 
this  defeat,  what  was  the  attitude  of  Greece? 

During  the  Second  Balkan  War,  Greece  had  occupied 
the  whole  of  Western  Thrace  as  far  as  the  Maritza;  she 

*  In  order  to  extenuate  the  responsibility  for  the  Second  Balkan  War,  which 
weighs  so  heavily  on  Bulgaria,  some  Bulgars  have  claimed  that  she  was 
obliged  to  attack  her  allies  because  she  knew  of  the  existence  of  the  Greco- 
Serbian  Treaty  of  Alliance. 

The  5th  Article  of  the  above  treaty  reads  as  follows: 

“  In  case  of  disagreement  with  Bulgaria  concerning  the  frontiers  as  above 
indicated,  and  if  any  amicable  settlement  becomes  impossible,  the  two  High 
Contracting  Parties  reserve  the  right,  by  mutual  understanding,  to  propose 
to  Bulgaria  that  the  dispute  should  be  submitted  to  the  mediation  or  arbitra¬ 
tion  of  the  sovereigns  of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  or  the  chiefs  of 
other  states. 

“In  case  Bulgaria  refuses  to  accept  this  form  of  peaceful  settlement  and 
assumes  a  threatening  attitude  against  one  of  the  two  Kingdoms,  or  attempts 
to  impose  her  claims  by  force,  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  solemnly 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  18 


had  driven  Bulgaria  back  to  the  frontiers  she  possessed 
before  the  First  Balkan  War.  Nevertheless,  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest,  Greece  agreed  to  hand  back  to 
Bulgaria  Western  Thrace,  where  the  Bulgarians  formed 
only  one-ninth  of  the  total  population,  and  where  there 
were  three  flourishing  Greek  cities — Xanthi,  Goumul- 
djina  and  Dedeagatch,  not  to  mention  large  and  pros¬ 
perous  rural  Greek  populations. 

Then  a  surprising  thing  occurred.  On  the  signature 
of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  Greece,  with  a  view  to  the 
execution  of  this  treaty,  wished  to  evacuate  Western 
Thrace  and  to  hand  it  over  to  Bulgaria.  But  Bulgaria 
begged  the  Greek  Government  to  delay  the  evacuation 
for  a  month  in  order  to  make  preparations  for  the  occu¬ 
pation  of  the  country.  She  feared  that,  if  the  Greek 
troops  retired  sooner,  Western  Thrace  would  be  occupied 
by  the  Turks  and  would  thus  be  lost  to  her.  Then,  when 
the  month  came  to  an  end  and  Bulgaria  was  still  unpre¬ 
pared,  she  asked  and  obtained  from  the  Greek  Govern¬ 
ment  a  further  delay.  Greece  prolonged  her  occupation 
until  Bulgaria  had  finished  her  preparations.  But  she 
had  scarcely  taken  possession  of  Western  Thrace,  when 
she  immediately  expelled  the  Greek  population  en  masse 
and  confiscated  all  their  property. 

The  conciliatory  attitude  of  Greece  toward  Bulgaria, 
at  the  time  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  may  appear 
inexplicable  if  one  takes  into  consideration  the  fact  that, 
at  that  moment,  I  no  longer  had  any  illusions  as  to  the 


bind  themselves  reciprocally  to  assist  each  other  with  all  their  armed  forces 
and  later,  to  conclude  peace  only  jointly  and  by  common  agreement.” 

The  terms  of  this  article  and  the  fact  that  the  treaty  was  only  concluded 
on  the  19th  of  May,  viz.,  several  days  after  the  serious  attack  of  the  Bulgars 
upon  the  Greek  positions  of  Mount  Panghæon,  prove  sufficiently  that  this 
treaty  cannot  excuse  Bulgaria’s  letting  loose  the  dogs  of  war  against  her 
allies. 

On  the  contrary,  it  was  Bulgaria’s  provocative  attitude  and  her  insistence 
on  dealing  with  territorial  questions  separately  with  each  of  her  allies,  which 
led  Greece  and  Serbia  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  alliance  in  case  Bulgaria  should 
refuse  to  submit  the  disputed  questions  to  arbitration  or  should  endeavor  to 
impose  her  claims  by  force.  Consequently,  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt 
as  to  the  purely  defensive  character  of  this  agreement. 


14  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 

possibility  of  constituting  a  Balkan  Confederation  which 
would  also  include  Bulgaria.  The  Second  Balkan  War 
had  proved  that,  at  least  for  a  whole  generation,  Bul¬ 
garia  could  no  longer  form  part  of  the  projected  Con- 
federation. 

The  concessions  made  by  the  Greek  Government,  how¬ 
ever,  are  explained  by  the  fact  that  a  portion  of  Euro¬ 
pean  and  American  public  opinion,  which  was  accus¬ 
tomed  to  consider  Bulgaria  as  the  most  important  factor 
in  the  Balkans,  did  not  reject  as  absolutely  unreasonable 
her  pretensions,  if  not  to  exercise  hegemony  in  the  P enin- 
sula,  at  least  to  occupy  a  preponderant  place  there.  It 
admitted  reluctantly  the  idea  that  Bulgaria  could  be 
deprived  of  the  greater  portion  of  the  fruits  of  the 
common  victory  over  Turkey.  This  tendency  became 
so  marked  that  a  strong  pressure  was  exercised  upon  the 
Greek  Government  with  a  view  to  ceding  to  Bulgaria 
even  Cavalla,  a  purely  Greek  town,  which  did  not  include 
a  single  Bulgarian  inhabitant. 

It  is  true  that,  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  Bulgaria 
had  had  taken  away  from  her,  for  the  benefit  of  Serbia, 
large  territories  whose  Slavophone  inhabitants,  who  had 
before  the  war  been  under  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  had 
generally  been  considered  as  aspiring  to  union  with  Bul¬ 
garia.  But  without  going  more  deeply  into  the  question 
as  to  whether  these  populations  are  more  akin  to  the 
Serbs  than  to  the  Bulgarians,  we  may,  with  certitude, 
admit  that  they  had  an  uncertain  national  consciousness. 
No  sooner  were  they  annexed  to  Serbia,  than,  with  few 
exceptions,  they  proved  to  be  good  Serbs,  just  as  they 
had  previously  been  considered  good  Bulgarians;  and,  to 
render  their  conversion  still  more  complete,  it  was  enough 
for  them  to  transform  the  termination  of  their  names  by 
adopting  the  Serbian  “  itch  ”  in  place  of  the  Bulgarian 
“  off.” 

In  order  to  judge  impartially  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest, 
one  should  take  into  account  the  fact  that,  as  a  result 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  15 

of  it,  Bulgaria  emerged  larger,  more  populous,  and 
richer  than  either  Greece  or  Serbia.  Driven  by  her 
blindness  to  attack  her  allies  of  yesterday,  when  attacked 
in  her  turn  by  Rumania  and  Turkey,  she  lost  in  this 
conflict  the  Bulgarian  Dobrudja,  Eastern  Thrace  and 
Adrianople,  none  of  which  losses  she  could  reasonably 
impute  to  her  allies  ;  but  that  which  remained  to  Bulgaria 
was  still  equal  to  Greece  in  area  and  population,  and 
exceeded  Serbia. 

What  was  the  policy  of  Bulgaria  after  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest?  A  review  of  it  will  enable  us  to  judge 
whether  the  responsibility  of  having  attacked  her  allies 
on  the  morrow  of  the  war  with  Turkey  lies  exclusively 
on  King  Ferdinand  and  the  Bulgarian  military  leaders. 
If  such  were  the  case,  the  Bulgarian  people  might  have 
the  benefit  of  “  extenuating  circumstances.”  On  the 
contrary,  if  it  is  found  that  the  whole  Bulgarian  people 
has  constantly  endeavored  to  impose  Bulgarian  hege¬ 
mony  on  the  Balkans,  the  verdict  must  be  more  severe, 
and  guarantees  must  be  imposed  against  the  renewal  of 
any  such  attempt. 

Shortly  after  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  the  European 
War,  the  Entente  Powers  made  the  most  tempting  offers 
to  Bulgaria;  retrocession  of  the  Dobrudja;  cession  of  the 
whole  of  Thrace  with  the  exception  of  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits;  cession  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Vardar 
and,  on  its  right  bank,  of  the  zone  which  was  considered, 
according  to  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  of  1912,  as 
incontestably  Bulgarian,  including  Monastir;  cession  of 
Eastern  Macedonia,  notwithstanding  the  protestations  of 
the  Greek  Government. 

Bulgaria  was  thus  offered  the  opportunity  of  repairing 
the  disaster  which  her  treason  in  1913  had  cost  her,  and 
of  becoming  as  powerful  a  Balkan  State  as  the  Bulgaria 
of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano.  For  the  second  time, 
however,  Bulgaria  showed  her  intention  of  not  being 
content  to  assume  merely  a  preponderant  position  in 


16  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 

the  Balkans,  but  of  seeking  to  establish  there  an  abso¬ 
lute  hegemony.  In  addition  to  the  whole  of  Macedonian 
Serbia,  she  claimed  no  less  than  a  large  part  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Serbia  as  it  existed  before  the  Balkan 
Wars.  As  the  basis  of  her  policy,  she  demanded  not 
only  the  weakening  of  Serbia  but  her  dismemberment. 
She  wished  further  to  annex  a  large  portion  of  Albania, 
in  order  to  become  a  maritime  Power  of  the  Adriatic. 
She  wanted  the  whole  of  the  Dobrudja,  including  even 
that  portion  which  had  belonged  to  Rumania  ever  since 
1878.  In  a  word,  Bulgaria  wanted  to  constitute  an 
utterly  new  state,  comprising  8,500,000  inhabitants,  of 
whom  barely  one-half  would  be  Bulgarians. 

It  was  only  toward  Greece  that  the  attitude  of  Bul¬ 
garia  was  at  this  time  conciliatory.  She  recognized  the 
right  of  Greece  to  the  frontiers  established  by  the  Treaty 
of  Bucharest;  the  word  sent  from  Berlin  was  to  the  effect 
that,  without  this  recognition,  the  policy  of  King  Con¬ 
stantine  would  become  impossible  in  Greece,  and  that, 
without  this  policy,  Bulgarian  imperialistic  dreams  would 
fade  away;  Bulgaria,  therefore,  agreed  to  postpone  the 
settlement  of  her  account  with  Greece.  If,  after  the 
European  War,  she  realized  her  dream  of  Balkan  hege¬ 
mony,  she  was  sure  of  being  able  to  seize  the  first  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  attack  Greece,  of  finding  her  on  the  morrow 
of  the  crushing  of  Serbia,  without  friends  and  without 
allies,  of  taking  from  her  Salonica,  Greek  Macedonia  and 
even  Epirus,  and  o£  driving  her  back  beyond  her  fron¬ 
tiers  of  1881. 

Such  is,  in  plain  words,  the  policy  of  Bulgaria,  which 
has  been  adopted  by  all  the  Bulgarian  political  parties 
except  the  “  narrow  ”  Socialists,  who  form  only  a  very 
small  minority  in  the  Bulgarian  Chamber.  This  is  the 
unvarying  policy  which  has  been  followed  by  Bulgaria 
from  the  very  establishment  of  the  Principality  forty 
years  ago.  It  is  not  a  merely  momentary  tendency. 

In  view  of  what  precedes,  one  can  see  how  impossible 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  17 

it  is  to  satisfy  Bulgaria,  without  completely  sacrificing 
the  other  Balkan  peoples,  and  without  concessions  which 
would  assure  her  the  immediate  hegemony  of  the  Balkans; 
or  would  at  least  bring  about  its  realization  in  the  near 
future.  Consequently,  we  know  that  any  settlement  of 
Balkan  affairs,  short  of  Bulgarian  hegemony,  would  be 
accepted  by  her  only  with  profound  dissatisfaction. 

There  is  therefore  no  reason  why  a  benevolent  disposi¬ 
tion  should  be  shown  to  Bulgaria.  She  should  content 
herself  with  the  strict  justice  of  the  Allies,  and  noth¬ 
ing  more.  It  would  be  a  flagrant  injustice  to  sacrifice 
to  her  the  legitimate  interests  of  other  peoples.  It 
would  be  an  act  stained  with  immorality,  for  it  would 
be  favoring  an  enemy  of  yesterday  to  the  detriment  of 
an  ally.  The  moral  purification  which  the  whole  of 
humanity  is  justified  in  expecting  after  the  catastrophe 
Germany  has  brought  on  the  whole  world,  would  be  for¬ 
ever  compromised.  Above  all,  this  would  be  an  act  of 
bad  policy. 

It  must  be  well  understood  that  Bulgaria  seeks  to  play 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  the  part  that  Prussia  has  played 
on  the  vast  European  stage.  Having  been  the  first 
Balkan  country  to  organize  a  strong  army,  she  believed 
she  could  easily  enslave  all  her  neighbors.  The  spirit  of 
militarism  is  as  deeply  rooted  in  Bulgaria  as  in  Prussia. 
The  Bulgarians  rightly  boast  of  being  the  “  Prussians  of 
the  Balkans.”  In  fact,  they  resemble  the  Prussians  in 
their  militaristic  spirit,  in  their  worship  of  brute  force, 
and  in  their  inhuman  manner  of  waging  war.  But  they 
are  far  from  equaling  the  Prussians  in  the  domains  of 
science,  of  letters  and  of  art. 

For  these  reasons,  if  the  Allies  are  bound  not  to 
commit  injustice  towards  Bulgaria,  if  they  are  to  apply 
to  her  case  the  high  principles  in  the  name  of  which  they 
have  fought,  they  have  at  the  same  time  the  duty  of 
showing  no  benevolence  whatever  towards  their  enemy  of 
yesterday.  If  they  are  to  carry  out  their  work  of  justice 


18  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 

and  not  compromise  the  future  of  the  Balkans,  the  Allies 
should  confine  themselves  to  according  to  the  Bulgarians 
the  place  to  which  they  are  entitled,  having  regard  to 
their  nationality  in  its  relation  to  the  other  Balkan 
peoples. 

The  question  has  been  asked  why,  when  I  was  disposed 
both  before  and  even  after  the  Balkan  Wars  to  make 
such  important  concessions  to  Bulgaria,  I  am  not  today 
animated  by  any  such  disposition. 

This  change  of  attitude  must  not  be  regarded  as  an 
inconsistency.  I  have  already  given  the  reasons  which 
impelled  me,  before  the  Second  Balkan  War,  to  make 
large  concessions  to  Bulgaria;  I  have  also  stated  the 
reasons  which  induced  me,  immediately  after  the  war, 
to  consent  to  cede  Western  Thrace  to  Bulgaria.  If,  even 
after  the  beginning  of  the  European  War,  I  thought  for 
an  instant  of  the  cession  of  Cavalla  to  Bulgaria,  I  did  so 
with  the  hope  of  securing  her  entrance  into  the  war  on 
the  side  of  the  Entente,  in  order  thereby  to  assure  and  to 
hasten  the  victory  of  the  Allies,  as  much  in  the  interests 
of  humanity  as  in  the  interests  of  my  own  country.  No 
such  reason  any  longer  exists. 

To  persist  in  the  same  tendency,  to  wish  still  to  make 
concessions  to  Bulgaria,  would  be,  on  my  part,  a  sort  of 
political  “  sickly  sentimentality.”  My  fellow-citizens 
would  justly  disavow  me,  for  such  a  policy  would  sacri¬ 
fice,  without  any  compelling  reason,  the  vital  interests 
of  my  country,  for  the  partial  satisfaction  of  an  insatiable 
neighbor,  who  would  take  advantage  of  it  to  exterminate 
the  alien  populations  fallen  under  his  domination  and 
would  draw  new  strength  therefrom  with  a  view  to  a  new 
attack  at  an  opportune  moment. 

III.  Constantinople 

In  virtue  of  the  12th  article  of  the  programme  of 
President  Wilson,  according  to  which  Ottoman  sover¬ 
eignty  will  be  maintained  solely  in  “  the  Turkish  portions 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  19 


of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire,”  Constantinople  cannot 
remain  under  the  Turkish  régime.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  vilayet  of  Constantinople,  comprising  Stamboul, 
Pera,  Scutari  and  the  suburbs  as  far  as  Chatalja,  has  a 
total  population  of  1,173,670  of  whom  only  449,114  are 
Turks. 

With  the  suppression  of  Ottoman  sovereignty,  the 
natural  solution  would  be  to  adjudge  Constantinople  and 
its  vilayet  to  Greece,  while  establishing  international 
guarantees  for  the  freedom  of  the  Straits. 

This  solution  is  all  the  more  indicated  because,  up  to 
the  time  of  the  Turkish  conquest,  Constantinople  had  for 
centuries  been  the  capital  of  the  Greek  Empire,  and 
before  that  time  had  been  for  several  hundred  years  a 
flourishing  Greek  colony. 

Even  today,  the  principal  element  in  the  native  popu¬ 
lation  is  Greek.  Comprising  364,459  souls,  it  is  numeri¬ 
cally  greater  than  all  the  other  nationalities  put  together, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Turks.  It  occupies  an  excep¬ 
tional  position  in  regard  to  economic  strength  and  intel¬ 
lectual  activity.  It  supports  237  schools,  with  30,000 
pupils.  Constantinople  is,  lastly,  the  seat  of  the  Greek 
(Ecumenical  Patriarchate. 

But  if  the  Society  of  Nations  were  to  be  established 
now,  Constantinople  might,  because  of  the  great  inter¬ 
national  interests  involved  in  the  possession  of  the  Straits, 
form  with  the  latter,  and  a  sufficient  hinterland ,  an  inter¬ 
national  State  under  the  protection  of  the  Society  of 
Nations,  which  would  appoint  its  Governor  for  certain 
fixed  periods.  This  Governor  would  be  charged  with 
safeguarding  the  international  interests  above  indicated, 
and  with  administering  the  State  with  the  necessary 
municipal  liberties. 


20  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


Asia  Minor 

The  article  already  cited  from  the  programme  of 
President  Wilson  governs  likewise  the  solution  of  the 
problem  of  Asia  Minor.  Ottoman  sovereignty  must, 
therefore,  be  limited  to  the  interior  of  the  country, 
where  the  Turkish  element  is  really  predominant. 

To  the  east,  the  Armenian  provinces,  with  Russian 
Armenia,  ought  to  be  erected  into  a  separate  State,  the 
organization  of  which  should  be  entrusted  to  one  of  the 
great  Powers,  as  the  mandatary  of  the  Society  of 
Nations.  Such  a  mandate  would  be  all  the  more  neces¬ 
sary  since,  as  the  result  of  the  systematic  destruction 
carried  out  for  the  past  quarter  of  a  century  under 
Hamidian  rule,  and  still  more  by  the  Young  Turks,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  find  an  administrative  district  in 
Turkish  Armenia  having  an  Armenian  majority.  It  is 
obvious  that  Turkey  should  not  be  allowed  to  profit  by 
the  systematic  annihilation  of  the  Armenian  nation, 
which  has  been  carried  out  in  order  to  maintain  her 
domination  over  the  Armenian  provinces.  The  con¬ 
science  of  mankind  would  revolt  at  this.  Besides,  these 
provinces  are  not  Turkish,  for  the  Turkish  element  con¬ 
tinues  to  be  in  a  minority  there  as  compared  with  the 
combined  strength  of  the  other  ethnical  elements. 

The  vilayet  of  Trebizond  might  be  attached  to  the  State 
of  Armenia.  The  compact  Greek  population  of  350,000 
people,  comprised  within  its  limits,  would  thus  have  the 
advantage  of  escaping  henceforth  from  Turkish  admin¬ 
istration.  The  same  is  true  of  the  vilayet  of  Adana, 
which  comprises  a  Greek  population  of  70,000  souls,  and 
which,  as  including  also  a  considerable  Armenian  popu¬ 
lation,  might,  with  even  more  reason,  be  incorporated  in 
the  Armenian  State. 

Moreover,  by  establishing  the  administrative  divisions  of 
the  State  on  the  basis  of  local  ethnical  conditions,  the 
sorely  tried  Christian  population  would  be  assured  an 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  21 

endurable  existence  and  would  thus  prepare  the  way  for 
the  ultimate  complete  independence  of  this  State. 

To  the  westward,  in  the  vilayets  of  Aidin,  and  Brussa, 
as  in  the  independent  sandjaks  of  the  Dardanelles  and 
Ismid,  live  in  compact  and  continuous  masses  1,013,195 
Greeks.  These  constitute  the  principal  element  of  the 
native  population.  They  have  been  established  there  un¬ 
interruptedly  for  three  thousand  years.  They  still  con¬ 
stitute  the  real  backbone  of  the  economic  and  intellectual 
life  of  the  country,  as  agriculturists,  merchants,  manu¬ 
facturers,  laborers  and  scholars. 

Divided  into  15  archdioceses  and  dioceses,  this  Greek 
population  supports,  by  the  resources  of  its  own  com¬ 
munities  alone,  565  churches  and  652  schools,  with  91,548 
pupils. 

If  to  this  population  be  added  the  almost  purely 
Greek  populations  of  the  neighboring  islands  of  Imbros, 
Tenedos,  Mytilene,  Chio,  Samos,  Icaria,  Rhodes,  the 
Dodecanesus  and  Castellorizo,  which,  both  geographically 
and  economically,  form  part  of  this  country,  Hellenism 
in  Western  Asia  Minor  shows  a  strength  of  1,383,333 
inhabitants  (see  Appendix  V) . 

We  may  deduct  from  this  number  the  83,000  Greeks 
inhabiting  the  city  of  Brussa  and  the  kazas  to  the  east 
of  this  city  which  it  would  be  just  to  leave  within  the 
limits  of  the  future  Turkish  State,  as  well  as  the  111,964 
other  Greeks  in  the  independent  sandjaks  of  the  Darda¬ 
nelles  and  Ismid.  Of  these,  the  former  should  share  the 
lot  of  Constantinople,  while  the  latter  should  either  go 
with  them  or  else  be  included  in  the  future  Turkish  State. 

The  remainder  (1,188,359  Greeks)  justifies  the  cutting 
off  from  Western  Asia  Minor,  and  adjudging  to  Greece, 
of  a  territory  which  would  comprise,  in  addition  to  the 
Islands,  a  part  of  the  vilayet  of  Brussa  and  the  vilayet 
of  Aidin,  with  the  exception  of  the  almost  exclusively 
Turkish  sandjak  of  Denizli.  (Cf.  map,  Appendix  Y.) 
This  territory  has  a  population  of  1,188,359  Greeks 


22  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


and  1,042,050  Mahommedans,  and  forms,  both  geo¬ 
graphically  and  historically,  a  specially  distinct  and  sepa¬ 
rate  section  of  Asia  Minor.* 

The  allocation  of  this  Asia  Minor  territory  to  Greece 
is  claimed  in  virtue  of  the  principle  already  accepted, 
according  to  which  the  “  other  nationalities  which  are 
now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted 
security  of  life,  and  an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity 
of  autonomous  development/’  (Number  XII  of  the 
fourteen  principles  of  President  Wilson.) 

In  sanctioning  the  right  of  peoples  to  decide  their  lot, 


*  Asia  Minor  is  thus  described  by  the  German  geographer  Philippson,  in  his 
book,  Reisen  und  Forschungen  im  Westlichen  Kleinasien,  of  which  the  fifth 
and  last  section  has  appeared  in  the  course  of  the  war,  in  1915: 

The  Peninsula  of  Asia  Minor  presents  a  geographical  contrast  which  ex¬ 
plains  the  part  played  in  history  by  this  country,  which  has  served  as  a  con¬ 
necting  link  between  the  Asiatic  and  Greco-European  civilizations. 

The  interior  of  this  extensive  country,  surrounded  on  north,  south  and  east 
by  chains  of  high  mountains,  is  made  up  of  lofty,  uniform  plains,  which  are 
often  shut  in  on  all  sides.  These  plateaus  themselves  are  traversed  by  lines 
of  mountains  which  cut  them  up  into  smaller  divisions.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  western  part  of  the  Peninsula,  starting  from  about  the  meridian  which 
passes  through  Constantinople,  presents  a  configuration  which  is  quite  dis¬ 
tinctive;  chains  of  mountains  which  vary  greatly  in  direction,  size  and  form 
are  interrupted  by  great  depressions  in  the  shape  of  trench-like  valleys  and 
basins,  which  extend,  in  part,  from  east  to  west,  from  the  mountainous  crown 
which  encircles  the  central  plain,  as  far  as  the  deeply  indented  coast,  toward 
which  they  discharge  rivers  of  considerable  size.  These  depressions,  even  more 
than  the  nature  of  the  mountains  themselves,  characterize  the  orographical 
configuration  of  Western  Asia  Minor,  to  which  they  furnish,  at  the  same  time, 
the  most  fertile  land  for  cultivation  and  the  easiest  ways  of  communication. 
In  this  cutting  up  of  the  country  into  deep  valleys,  in  these  coasts  so  fre¬ 
quently  indented  by  reason  of  these  very  depressions,  as  well  as  by  a  general 
sinking  away  of  the  terrain  in  a  recent  geological  epoch,  is  to  be"  recognized 
a  peculiarity  common  to  Western  Asia  Minor  and  to  Greece,  such  that  the  two 
may  be  considered  as  constituting  but  one  geographical  entity,  that  of  the 
Ægean.  To  these  differences  of  structure  and  form  between  the  interior  of 
Asia  Minor  and  its  western  part,  there  corresponds  a  difference  of  climate 
and  vegetation,  which  is  equally  rich  in  results.  For  in  the  plateau  of  the 
interior,  hemmed  in,  as  it  is,  by  mountains,  reign  drought  and  the  severe 
winter  of  the  steppes.  Whereas  the  winds  from  the  sea  bring  to  the  more 
open  West,  in  the  course  of  the  mild  winter,  abundant  rains,  which  feed  the 
numerous  water  courses  so  that  only  the  summer  season  in  that  region  is  dry. 
It  is,  then,  a  genuinely  Mediterranean  climate  and  a  vegetation  appropriate 
to  this  climate  which  characterize  this  western  region  of  the  Peninsula.  Thus 
Asia  Minor  is  separated  right  in  the  middle  by  a  great  natural  frontier:  on 
the  one  side,  an  inclosed  plateau  of  an  almost  Asiatic  nature,  on  the  other  an 
Ægean  land,  exactly  like  the  Greek  regions  and  closely  connected,  by  nature 
and  history,  with  the  sea  and  with  Greece,  just  beyond  the  sea.  The  result  is,, 
that  now,  as  in  the  past,  Asiatic  civilization  reigns  in  the  interior,  while  Greek 
culture  prevails  in  Western  Asia  Minor. 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  23 


this  principle  evidently  does  not  deprive  them  of  the  right 
to  choose  for  themselves  annexation  to  a  state  of  the 
same  nationality,  already  existing,  in  preference  to  the 
creation  of  an  autonomous  state.  It  is  incontestable  that 
such  is  the  preference  of  the  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor,  as 
to  Greece,  their  mother  country.  It  is,  therefore,  im¬ 
possible  to  understand  why  we  should  stop  with  the 
decision  that  the  Greeks  of  Western  Asia  Minor  should 
be  obliged  to  form  an  autonomous  state,  when  the  object 
aimed  at  today  is  precisely  to  reunite,  as  far  as  possible, 
under  the  same  government,  the  various  portions  of  each 
nationality. 

If  an  autonomous  state  were  created  in  Western  Asia 
Minor,  this  state,  by  reason  of  its  population  and  of  the 
economic  and  cultural  supremacy  of  the  Hellenic  ele¬ 
ment,  as  well  as  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  this  element 
has  for  thirty  centuries  uninterruptedly  held  in  these 
regions  a  predominant  place,  would  constitute  an  essen¬ 
tially  Hellenic  state.  The  co-existence  of  two  Hellenic 
states  would  soon  create,  on  both  sides,  a  natural  tend¬ 
ency  toward  union.  This  would  occasion  fresh  inter¬ 
national  friction,  whereas,  after  this  world  war  and  the 
complete  victory  of  the  democratic  nations,  all  territorial 
questions  ought,  as  far  as  possible,  to  find  their  solution, 
and  the  creation  of  new  problems  ought  to  be  avoided. 

It  is  equally  inconceivable  that  Ottoman  rule  should 
continue  to  be  exercised  in  this  western  portion  of  Asia 
Minor.  After  the  tragic  experience  of  a  whole  century, 
it  is  impossible  to  entrust  the  future  of  the  Christian 
populations  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  fresh  attempts  at 
reform.  These  people  know  only  too  well  that,  especially 
during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  every  time  that  an 
attempt  has  been  made  to  introduce  reforms  in  their 
favor,  the  old  Turks,  like  the  Young  Turks,  have  begun 
the  application  of  them  by  massacring  on  a  vast  scale  the 
Christians  who  were  to  benefit  by  these  reforms. 

In  the  course  of  the  World  War,  700,000  Armenians 


24  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 

and  300,000  Greeks  have  been  exterminated.  How  can 
the  Peace  Congress  send  these  unhappy  peoples  back 
under  the  Turkish  yoke,  renewing  the  derisive  promises 
of  new  reforms  in  their  interest?  We  must  not,  further¬ 
more,  forget  that  between  1914  and  1918,  four  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  Greeks  have  been  expelled  by  the 
Turkish  Government  and  have  had  to  take  temporary 
refuge  in  Greece;  that  several  other  hundreds  of  thou¬ 
sands  have  been  deported  from  the  coast  to  the  interior, 
where  the  greater  part  of  them  have  died.  The  mere 
reinstating  of  the  survivors  in  their  homes  and  on  their 
confiscated  lands  presupposes  necessarily  the  abolition  of 
Turkish  sovereignty. 

The  fact  that  a  great  proportion  of  the  trade  with 
the  interior  of  Asia  Minor  passes  through  the  port  of 
Smyrna,  does  not  militate  against  the  solution  that  we 
uphold.  Although  what  will  be  left  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  will  have  several  outlets  on  the  sea,  nothing 
prevents  the  Peace  Congress  from  guaranteeing  the  use 
of  this  port  for  the  import  and  export  trade  of  Turkey. 

I  shall  not  fail  to  invoke  a  further  and  most  weighty 
argument  in  favor  of  the  annexation  of  Western  Asia 
Minor  to  Greece.  It  is  that  the  million  Greeks  who  in¬ 
habit  that  region  constitute,  together  with  the  people  of 
the  Islands,  the  purest  part  of  the  Hellenic  race;  that 
is  to  say,  the  portion  that  has  best  preserved  its  ethnical 
type.  It  must  also  be  taken  into  consideration  that,  to 
the  east  of  this  western  portion  of  Asia  Minor,  there 
is  a  Greek  population  of  922,545,  divided  into  arch¬ 
dioceses  and  dioceses,  and  supporting  1,740  churches  and 
1,386  schools,  with  100,863  pupils  (see  Appendix  IV). 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  a  portion  of  this  population 
will  be  included  in  the  International  State  of  Constanti¬ 
nople,  and  that  another  part  of  it  will  be  comprised  in  the 
Armenian  State,  which  will  certainly  be  organized.  Even 
then,  however,  some  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Greeks  will 
remain  under  the  Turkish  Government  of  Central  Asia 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  25 


Minor.  For  this  evil  there  is  only  one  possible  remedy. 
Under  the  Peace  Treaty,  the  Turkish  Government  should 
undertake  to  purchase  the  real  estate  belonging  to  such 
of  the  Greeks  inhabiting  Turkish  territory  as  may  desire 
to  emigrate  into  Greek  Asia  Minor.  The  Greek  Govern¬ 
ment  should  adopt  the  same  policy  in  regard  to  real 
estate  belonging  to  Turks  who  would  like  to  move  into 
Turkish  Asia  Minor.  There  would  thus  be  started  cur¬ 
rents  of  reciprocal  and  voluntary  migrations,  thanks  to 
which  it  might  be  hoped  that  in  the  course  of  a  few  years 
what  is  to  remain  of  the  Turkish  State  would  be  composed 
almost  exclusively  of  Mahommedans. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  recall  that  in  January, 
1915,  the  Entente  Powers  promised  my  Government 
very  important  territorial  concessions  on  the  coast  of 
Asia  Minor,  and  that  after  my  retirement  from  office, 
the  same  promises  were  given  to  the  Government  which 
succeeded  mine  in  April  of  the  same  year,  with  the 
assurance  that  the  vilayet  of  Aidin  was  included  in  these 
concessions.  These  promises,  it  is  true,  are  in  no  way 
binding  on  the  Peace  Congress,  any  more  than  they  are 
on  the  Powers  who  made  them.  They  were  given  on 
condition  that  Greece  should  immediately  come  into  the 
war.  This  condition  was  not  fulfilled,  but  Greece  should 
not  be  held  responsible  for  that.  The  Allied  Powers  are 
aware  that  I  left  no  stone  unturned  to  the  end  that  in 
this  world  war  Greece  should  throw  in  her  lot  with  them. 
They  also  know  that  the  Greek  people  have  faithfully 
followed  me.  At  the  General  Elections,  after  my  first 
disagreement  with  ex-King  Constantine,  in  February, 
1915,  the  people  again  gave  me  a  substantial  majority, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that,  at  this  election,  the  issue  laid 
before  them  was  to  choose  between  the  policy  of  Veni- 
zelos,  who  wanted  war,  and  the  policy  of  the  King,  who 
wanted  peace.  In  September,  1915,  when  the  ex-King, 
betraying  his  country,  violated  the  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Serbia,  Greece  did  not  hesitate  to  bring  about  a  révolu- 


26  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 

tion,  in  order,  by  this  means,  to  take  part  in  the  war. 
May  I  be  allowed  to  say  that,  in  view  of  such  circum¬ 
stances,  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible  for  a 
country  to  have  pursued  a  more  meritorious  policy  than 
has  Greece. 

When  once  Turkish  sovereignty  in  Western  Asia 
Minor  is  abolished,  no  other  solution  short  of  that  put 
forward  by  Greece  can  be  adopted,  without  flagrantly 
violating  the  principles  in  the  name  of  which  the  Allies 
have  fought.  One  of  the  chief  and  noblest  objects  of 
this  war  has  been  to  defend  the  smaller  nations  against 
aggressions  by  the  larger  states.  Western  Asia  Minor 
has  been  peopled  for  thousands  of  years  by  one  of  the 
most  ancient  nations  of  Europe.  A  century  ago,  that 
nation  freed  itself  from  its  long  servitude  and  gained 
its  liberty.  Since  then,  it  has  struggled  to  achieve  its 
national  unity.  How  can  one  conceive  that  the  demo¬ 
cratic  peoples,  after  the  complete  victory  they  have  won 
in  defense  of  the  independence  of  the  smaller  nations  and 
their  right  to  self-determination,  could  place  one  of  the 
most  homogeneous  portions  of  the  Greek  nation  under 
any  foreign  Power  whatever,  simply  because  it  happens 
to  be  a  Great  Power,  while  Greece  is  only  a  small  nation? 
How  could  they  thus  undermine,  at  its  very  base,  the 
moral  foundation  of  the  Society  of  Nations? 

The  Islands 

So  far  as  the  Islands  are  concerned,  they  have  been 
Greek  for  thousands  of  years,  and  as  such  they  ought 
to  be  returned  to  Greece,  even  without  exception  being 
made  of  those  which,  for  strategic  reasons,  were  not 
allotted  to  Greece  at  the  time  of  the  Balkan  Wars. 

It  is  true  that  by  the  Treaty  of  April  26,  1915,  it 
was  arranged  between  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  and 
Italy  that  the  latter  should  annex  Rhodes  and  the  Dode¬ 
canese.  But,  at  the  time  this  treaty  was  signed,  the 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  27 

war  had  not  yet  assumed  the  character  which  was  given 
to  it  later  by  the  Allied  Governments’  declarations  and 
by  the  principles  proclaimed  by  President  Wilson.  It  is 
now  admitted  that  those  principles  will  form  the  basis 
of  the  future  Peace.  The  Greek  Government  has  there¬ 
fore  no  doubt  that  its  great  neighbor,  Italy,  will  itself 
take  the  initiative  in  proposing  the  restoration  of  these 
islands  to  Greece,  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  from  the 
international  point  of  view,  they  continue  to  form  an 
integral  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  Greek  Gov¬ 
ernment  is  convinced  that  Italy  cannot  desire  to  impose 
its  sovereignty  upon  purely  Greek  populations  and  thus 
to  create  a  constant  source  of  friction  between  two 
peoples  bound  together  by  their  mutual  relations  in  the 
past,  which,  along  with  their  situation  as  near  neighbors, 
invite  them  to  a  closer  collaboration  in  the  future. 


APPENDIX  I 


The  International  Commission  of  Control,  in  order  to 
avoid  the  resumption  of  hostilities,  believes  it  to  be  its 
duty  to  reconcile  as  much  as  possible  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Epirote  populations  with  regard  to  the  special 
dispositions  which  they  ask  for,  and  that  of  the  Albanian 
Government.  It  is  with  this  idea  in  mind  that  the  Com¬ 
mission  has  agreed  to  submit  to  the  Powers  which  it 
represents,  as  well  as  to  the  Albanian  Government,  the 
enclosed  text,  which  is  the  result  of  discussions  between 
the  members  of  this  Commission  and  the  Epirote  dele¬ 
gates  : 

Corfu,  May  17,  1914, 

Signed: 

Winchei,  A.  Leoni,  Krai,  Malidi  Frasheri,  Harry  H* 

Lamb,  Leon  Krajawski,  A.  Tetriaew. 

Signed  subject  to  the  approval  of  our  Principals: 

G.  Christaki-Zographos,  Al.  C.  Carapanos. 


PROVISIONS  CONCERNING  THE  TERRI¬ 
TORIES  EVACUATED  BY  THE  GREEK 
TROOPS  AND  FORMING  THE  PROVINCES 
OF  ARGYROCASTRO  AND  CORYTZA 

I.  Organization 

The  execution  and  maintenance  of  the  provisions  laid 
down  for  the  organization  of  the  two  southern  provinces 
are  now  entrusted  to  the  C.I.C.  (Commission  Inter¬ 
nationale  de  Contrôle).  The  Commission  will  organize 
the  department  of  administration  and  that  of  justice  and 

28 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  29 

finance.  The  Albanian  Government,  by  agreement  with 
the  C.I.C.,  will  appoint  and  dismiss  the  governors  and 
high  officials,  taking  into  account,  as  much  as  possible, 
the  numerical  importance  of  the  adherents  of  each 
religion. 


II.  Local  Councils 

The  number  of  elective  members  in  the  administrative 
councils  shall  be  at  least  three  times  the  number  of  the 
de  jure  members. 

III.  Administrative  Delimitation  and  Subdivision 

The  C.I.C.  will  supervise  both  the  administrative  de¬ 
limitation  and  subdivision  of  the  two  provinces,  and  this 
when  once  settled  cannot  be  further  modified  without  the 
consent  of  the  Powers. 

IV.  Territory 

/ 

All  the  provisions  in  question  shall  apply  to  the  popu¬ 
lations  of  the  territories  previously  occupied  by  Greece 
and  annexed  to  Albania. 

V.  Gendarmery 

For  the  maintenance  of  order  in  the  southern  provinces 
there  shall  be  created,  with  officers,  non-commissioned 
officers  and  gendarmes,  a  local  gendarmery  composed  of 
representatives  of  each  of  the  different  religious  faiths, 
in  proportion  to  the  number  of  members  of  each  sect  in 
these  provinces.  This  gendarmery  may  serve  outside  the 
limits  of  these  provinces  only  for  a  fixed  period  and  then 
only  in  the  case  of  force  majeure  as  recognized  by  the 
C.I.C.  The  same  restrictions  shall  apply  to  employment 
in  these  southern  provinces  of  corps  of  gendarmery  com¬ 
posed  of  men  who  are  not  natives.  Officers  commanding 


30  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


gendarmery  are  recommended  to  employ  in  the  various 
localities  only  detachments  of  men  who  belong  to  the 
same  religious  faith  as  the  inhabitants  of  the  locality. 

In  cases  where  the  local  element  proves  insufficient  to 
furnish  the  proportional  component  part  of  the  gen¬ 
darmery,  recourse  will  be  had  to  natives  of  other  Al¬ 
banian  provinces.  In  conformity  with  the  principles  set 
forth  above,  the  Dutch  officers  will  immediately  proceed 
with  the  work  of  enrollment.  It  is  understood  that  the 
foregoing  provisions  will  not  impair  the  unity  of  the 
Albanian  gendarmery,  as  laid  down  by  the  Conference 
of  London. 


VI.  Armed  Forces 

Except  in  the  case  of  war  or  revolution  in  the  southern 
provinces,  non-native  military  units  shall  not  be  trans¬ 
ferred  to  or  employed  in  these  provinces. 

VII.  Orthodox  Communities 

The  Orthodox  Christian  communities  are  recognized 
as  juridical  persons,  like  the  others.  They  will  enjoy 
the  possession  of  their  property,  and  be  free  to  dispose 
of  it  as  they  please.  The  relations  of  the  Orthodox  com¬ 
munities  with  their  spiritual  chiefs  will  be  as  in  the  past. 
The  ancient  rights  and  hierarchical  organization  of  the 
said  communities  shall  not  be  impaired  except  under 
agreement  between  the  Albanian  Government  and  the 
(Ecumenical  Patriarchate  of  Constantinople. 

VIII.  Schools 

Education  shall  be  free.  In  the  schools  of  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  communities  the  instruction  shall  be  in  Greek.  In 
the  three  elementary  classes  Albanian  will  be  taught  con¬ 
currently  with  Greek.  Nevertheless,  religious  education 
shall  be  exclusively  in  Greek. 


GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS  31 


IX.  Liberty  of  Language 

In  virtue  of  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  Note  of  the 
Powers  to  Greece,  dated  April  11/24/1914,  the  permis¬ 
sion  to  use  both  Albanian  and  Greek  shall  be  assured  in 
the  southern  provinces  before  all  the  authorities,  includ¬ 
ing  the  Courts,  as  well  as  the  elective  councils. 

X.  Occupation 

The  C.I.C.  will  take  possession  of  the  territory  in 
question,  in  the  name  of  the  Albanian  Government,  by 
proceeding  to  the  place.  The  officers  of  the  Dutch 
Mission  will  at  once  begin  the  organization  of  the  local 
gendarmery.  Provisionally,  and  until  the  formation  of 
this  local  gendarmery,  the  Dutch  officers,  with  the  help 
of  local  elements,  will  make  themselves  responsible  for 
public  security. 

The  C.I.C.  will  also  proceed  to  the  constitution  of 
mixed  commissions,  composed  of  Christians  and  Mussul¬ 
mans,  in  the  respective  numerical  importance  of  these 
elements.  For  the  time  being,  and  until  the  organization 
of  the  local  authorities,  these  commissions  will  assume 
administrative  functions  under  the  effective  surveillance 
of  the  C.I.C.,  of  which  surveillance  the  latter  will  deter¬ 
mine  the  extent.  Before  the  arrival  of  the  Dutch  officers, 
the  necessary  steps  will  be  taken  by  the  Provisional 
Government  of  Argyrocastro  for  the  removal  from  the 
country  of  all  armed  foreign  elements.  These  provisions 
will  not  only  be  applied  in  that  part  of  the  province  of 
Corytza  now  occupied  militarily  by  Albania,  but  also  in 
the  other  southern  regions. 

XI.  Relief 

The  Albanian  Government,  in  agreement  with  the 
C.I.C.,  will  take  the  necessary  measures  to  relieve  the 
population  which  has  suffered  from  the  events  of  recent 
years. 


32  GREECE  BEFORE  PEACE  CONGRESS 


XII.  Amnesty 

A  full  and  complete  amnesty  is  granted  to  the 
Epirotes  for  all  acts  prior  to  the  occupation  of  these 
provinces  by  the  representatives  of  the  Albanian  Gov¬ 
ernment.  No  person  not  of  Epirote  origin  shall  be 
prosecuted  in  respect  of  the  period  above  mentioned 
except  for  non-political  offenses. 

XIII.  Guarantee 

The  Powers  who,  by  the  Conference  of  London,  have 
guaranteed  the  institution  of  Albania  and  established  the 
C.I.C.  guarantee  the  execution  and  maintenance  of  the 
foregoing  provisions. 


APPENDIX  II 


STATISTICS  OF  THE  POPULATION  OF  THRACE 
ACCORDING  TO  NATIONALITIES 


APPENDIX  No.2 


Vilayet  of  Adrianople 


San- 

djaks 

KAZAS 

Greeks 

Turks 

Bulga¬ 

rians 

Arme¬ 

nians 

Jews 

Other 

nation¬ 

alities 

Total 

Adrianople  . 

41,285 

44,953 

7,000 

3,500 

9,500 

300 

106,538 

Hafsa  . 

9,160 

8,235 

730 

i  t 

«< 

it 

18,125 

p— < 

Dlmotika  . 

22,080 

6,315 

1,460 

150 

1,110 

t  i 

31,115 

ft 

o 

Mustapha-Pasha  . 

7,000 

10,000 

13,000 

(  < 

400 

a 

30,400 

aj 

Ortakeui  . 

14,562 

15,273 

4,060 

i  < 

«  ( 

300 

34,195 

•  H 

Ouzoum-Keupru  . 

19,197 

10,610 

5,600 

i  i 

ii 

i  i 

35,407 

Kirdjali  . 

a 

32,000 

it 

i  t 

a 

it 

32,000 

113,284 

127,386 

31,850 

3,650 

11,010 

600 

287,780 

Kirk-Kilisse  . 

28,171 

16,420 

14,695 

f  ( 

880 

i  t 

60,166 

Agathupolis  . 

8,050 

1,250 

1,700 

i  ( 

«  ( 

i  t 

11,000 

93 

Viza  . 

16,815 

9,140 

tt 

6  ( 

it 

i  i 

25,955 

•H 

Midia  . 

9,180 

660 

400 

i  < 

it 

it 

10,240 

•H 

Lule-Burgas  . 

7,662 

13,839 

655 

50 

230 

it 

22,436 

• 

Baba-Eski  . 

6,624 

9,728 

975 

i  l 

<  i 

ii 

17,327 

•H 

Tyrnovo  . 

t  i 

2,150 

10,230 

a 

t  i 

i  i 

12,380 

M 

76,502 

53,187 

28,655 

50 

1,110 

i  t 

159,504 

Rodosto  . 

26,020 

20,775 

ii 

13,000 

2,500 

it 

62,295 

o 

Tchorlu  . 

11,100 

13,500 

i  t 

1,600 

1,300 

1 1 

27,500 

93 

Malgara  . 

15,020 

14,390 

2,730 

3,200 

i  i 

396 

35,736 

o 

Harioupolls  . 

3,410 

15,060 

250 

ii 

i  i 

i  t 

18,720 

(4 

55,550 

63,725 

2,980 

17,800 

3,800 

396 

144,251 

Gallipoli  . 

17,869 

11,487 

i  t 

1,250 

1,850 

t  i 

32,456 

•fH 

Madytos  . 

8,967 

5,252 

a 

30 

♦  ♦ 

it 

14,249 

o 

Myriophyton  . 

19,206 

1,569 

i  t 

1  i 

«  < 

it 

20,775 

ft 

•H 

Peristasis  . 

12,046 

2,935 

tt 

a 

i  i 

tt 

14,981 

r— ^ 

a] 

Keshan  . 

12,343 

11,370 

2,000 

i  i 

ii 

a 

25,713 

o 

70,431 

32,613 

2,000 

1,280 

1,850 

i  i 

108,174 

Dedeagateh  . 

7,371 

10,670 

11,358 

350 

230 

i  i 

29,979 

<5)43 

Enos  . 

3,600 

3,590 

t  i 

i  i 

i  i 

i  i 

7,190 

<D  V 

'O  tî 

Sufli  . 

17,880 

32,140 

5,380 

'  30 

20 

100 

55,550 

n  68 

28,851 

46,400 

16,738 

380 

250 

100 

92,719 

Gumuldjina  . 

9,160 

50,000 

10,550 

800 

1,200 

i  i 

71,710 

ci 

Xanthi  . 

10,275 

22,000 

1,695 

100 

80 

i  i 

34.150 

c 

•F* 

Achi-Tehelembi  . 

2,310 

20,000 

12,875 

<  < 

ii 

it 

35,185 

•n 

Dari-Dere  . 

<1 

20,000 

500 

<  t 

i  ( 

i  { 

20,500 

”3 

Egri-Dere  . 

i  i 

35,000 

f  i 

it 

t  t 

i  i 

35,000 

a 

s 

Sultan-Yeri  . 

i  f 

38,000 

i  i 

U 

ii 

tt 

38,000 

o 

21,745 

185,000 

25,620 

900 

1,280 

i  t 

234,545 

Total 

in  the  Vilayet . 

366,363 

508,311 

107,843 

24,060 

19,300 

1,096 

1,026,973 

Vilayet  of  Constantinople 


• 

•H 

Stamboul . 

45,520 

213,605 

2,859 

78,241 

10,814 

7,502 

358,541 

£  o 

Pera  . 

175,200 

90,178 

1,472 

40,989 

27,877 

123,656 

459,372 

42  o, 

M  O 

Kutchuk-Tchekmedje  . . . 

14,495 

4,950 

i  i 

3,500 

100 

150 

23,195 

a  a 

o 

o 

235,215 

308,733 

4,331 

122,730 

38,791 

131,308 

841,108 

Chatalja  . . 

32.225 

7,200 

tt 

30 

25 

20 

39,530 

•  ci 

Bouyouk-Tchekmetje  . . . 

11,681 

3,980 

tt 

i  i 

it 

tt 

15,661 

ci  .i-> 

Silivri  . 

10,851 

4,920 

1 1 

873 

2,010 

230 

18,884 

w  +-> 

54,787 

16,100 

i  i 

903 

2,035 

250 

74,075 

Skutari  . 

34,640 

81,117 

it 

30,360 

5,670 

17,000 

168,787 

Khartalimi  . 

9,670 

10,500 

it 

2,200 

25 

i  t 

22,395 

•H 

Guebize  . 

8,000 

12,300 

tt 

t  i 

it 

300 

20,600 

03 

Princes  Islands  . 

10,250 

670 

tt 

300 

it 

800 

12,020 

Beikoz  . 

2,597 

4,894 

tt 

1,900 

it 

397 

9,788 

CO 

Chill  . 

9,300 

14,800 

tt 

800 

ii 

i  i 

24,900 

74,457 

134,281 

tt 

35,560 

5,695 

18,497 

258,490 

Total  in  the  Vilayet.... 

364,459 

449,114 

4,331 

159,193 

46,521 

150,055 

1,173,673 

Total 

in  THRACE . . 

730,822 

957,425 

112,174 

183,253 

65,821 

151,151 

2,200,646 

35 


APPENDIX  III 

Greek  Populations 

1.  Vilayet  of  Aidin. .  622,810 

2.  —  Brussa  .  278,421 

3.  Independent  Sandjak  of  Ismid .  73,134 

4.  —  —  of  Dardanelles .  38,830 

5.  Tenedos  .  3,752 

6.  Imbros  .  8,125 

7.  Mytilene  .  115,773 

8.  Chios .  69,724 

9.  Samos .  47,277 

10.  Nicaria  .  12,760 

11.  Castellorizon  .  10,000 

12.  Rhodes  and  Dodecanesus . 102,727 


Total  .  1,383,333 


APPENDIX  IV 

Greek  Populations 

1.  Vilayet  of  Sivas .  99,376 

2.  —  Angora  .  45,873 

3.  —  Trebizond .  353,533 

4.  —  Koniah  .  87,021 

5.  —  Kastamouni  .  24,919 

6.  —  Adana .  70,009 

7.  Part  of  the  Vilayet  of  Brussa .  129,859 

8.  Independent  Sandjak  of  Ismid .  73,134 

9.  —  —  of  Dardanelles .  38,839 


Total  .  922,545 


36 


APPENDIX  NO.S 


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